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Summary
Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) is an instantaneous, intense energy field that can
overload or disrupt at a distance numerous electrical systems and high technology
microcircuits, which are especially sensitive to power surges.  A large scale EMP
effect can be produced by a single nuclear explosion detonated high in the
atmosphere.  This method is referred to as High-Altitude EMP (HEMP).  A similar,
smaller-scale EMP effect can be created using non-nuclear devices with powerful
batteries or reactive chemicals.  This method is called High Power Microwave
(HPM).  Several nations, including reported sponsors of terrorism, may currently
have a capability to use EMP as a weapon for cyber warfare or cyber terrorism to
disrupt communications and other parts of the U.S. critical infrastructure.  Also,
some equipment and weapons used by the U.S. military may be vulnerable to the
effects of EMP.
The threat of an EMP attack against the United States is hard to assess, but some
observers indicate that it is growing along with worldwide access to newer
technologies and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.  In the past, the threat of
mutually assured destruction provided a lasting deterrent against the exchange of
multiple high-yield nuclear warheads.  However, now even a single, specially-
designed low-yield nuclear explosion high above the United States, or over a
battlefield, can produce a large-scale EMP effect that could result in a widespread
loss of electronics, but no direct fatalities, and may not necessarily evoke a large
nuclear retaliatory strike by the U.S. military. This, coupled with the possible
vulnerability of U.S. commercial electronics and U.S. military battlefield equipment
to the effects of EMP, may create a new incentive for other countries to develop or
acquire a nuclear capability. 
Policy issues raised by this threat include (1) what is the United States doing to
protect civilian critical infrastructure systems against the threat of EMP, (2) how does
the vulnerability of U.S. civilian and military electronics to EMP attack encourage
other nations to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, and (3) how likely are terrorist
organizations to launch a smaller-scale EMP attack against the United States?
This report will be updated as events warrant.
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High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP)
and High Power Microwave (HPM) Devices:
Threat Assessments
Background
A Commission to Assess the Threat from High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse
(EMP commission) was established by Congress in FY2001 after several experts
expressed concern that the U.S. critical infrastructure and military were vulnerable
to EMP attack.1  At a July 22, 2004, hearing before the House Armed Services
Committee, panel members from the EMP commission reportedly stated that a high-
altitude nuclear burst could emit electromagnetic energy powerful enough to
permanently disable many U.S. critical infrastructure computers, and also that as U.S.
military weapons and control systems become more complex, they may be
increasingly vulnerable to the effects of EMP.  The consensus of the commission is
that a large-scale EMP attack could possibly cause widespread damage to
unprotected civilian and military electronic equipment for an extended period.2
Some observers indicate that the threat of an EMP attack against the United
States may be growing along with worldwide access to newer technologies and the
proliferation of nuclear weapons.3   A single, specially-designed, low-yield nuclear
explosion high above the United States, or over a battlefield, can produce a large-
scale EMP effect resulting in widespread loss of electronics, but possibly without
direct fatalities.  In the past, the threat of mutually assured destruction provided a
lasting deterrent against the exchange of multiple high-yield nuclear warheads.
However, an EMP attack directed against the United States involving no violent
destruction, nor instant death for large numbers of U.S. citizens, may not necessarily
evoke massive nuclear retaliation by the U.S. military, where, for example, large
numbers of innocent civilians of a nation with a rogue leader might be killed.  Today,
the perceived lower risk of assured destruction by the United States, and the
perceived vulnerability of U.S. civilian and U.S. military computers to the effects of
an EMP attack may create a new incentive for other countries to develop or acquire
a nuclear capability. 
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EMP Commission Reestablished for 2006-2007  
The EMP commission was reestablished by P.L. 109-163, the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2006.  The new Commission to Assess the Threat to the
United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack (note that the new title no longer
includes the phrase “High Altitude”, and adds the new word “Attack”) will continue
with the same membership, and the Secretary of Defense is authorized to appoint a
new member in the event of a vacancy.4  The EMP commission is tasked to monitor,
investigate, and make recommendations about the vulnerability of electric-dependent
systems of the Department of Defense, government agencies, and the private sector.
The EMP commission is also directed to submit a report to Congress by June 30,
2007, to assess progress in protecting these systems from EMP attack, and to make
recommendations for better protection of these systems.
The EMP Commission’s 2004 Report  
On July 22, 2004, the EMP commission presented a report to the House Armed
Services Committee, consisting of the following five volumes:
Volume 1 is an unclassified Executive Summary.  
Volume 2 is a classified Threat Assessment.  
Volume 3 is an unclassified Assessment of the U.S. Critical Infrastructure.  
Volume 4 is a classified discussion of Military Topics.
Volume 5 is a classified Assessment of Potential Threats.
The report stated that EMP is capable of causing catastrophic consequences for
the nation, and that the current vulnerability of our critical infrastructures, which
depend so heavily on computers and electronics, can both invite and reward attack
if not corrected.5  
Specifically referring to the U.S. military, the report states: 
... EMP test facilities have been mothballed or dismantled, and research
concerning EMP phenomena, hardening design, testing, and maintenance has
been substantially decreased.  However, the emerging threat environment,
characterized by a wide spectrum of actors that include near-peers, established
nuclear powers, rogue nations, sub-national groups, and terrorist organizations
that either now have access to nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles or may have
such access over the next 15 years have [sic] combined to place the risk of EMP
attack and adverse consequences on the U.S. to a level that is not acceptable....
Our increasing dependence on advanced electronics systems results in the
potential for an increased EMP vulnerability of our technologically advanced
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forces, and if unaddressed makes EMP employment by an adversary an attractive
asymmetric option.”6
The EMP commission proposed a five-year plan for protecting critical
infrastructures from EMP and from other large-scale terrorist attacks.  The five-year
plan is briefly summarized in Volume 3 of the report, and more details of the plan
may be made available to the public in 2006.  However, some portions of the
five-year plan that are related to military equipment may remain classified.  
Questions about Vulnerability to EMP  
Some analysts discount the likelihood of a large-scale EMP attack against the
United States in the near term, and the extent of possible damage, stating that the
critical infrastructure reportedly would survive, and that military communications
would continue to operate and a high percentage of civilian phone calls would
continue to connect.  These analysts state that limited testing has shown that modern
commercial equipment may be surprisingly resistant to the effects of electromagnetic
pulse, and that some military systems using commercial equipment are also
retrofitted to be made more EMP resistant before they are fielded.7  However, other
analysts maintain that some testing done by the U.S. military may have been flawed,
or incomplete, leading to faulty conclusions about the level of resistance of
commercial equipment to the effects of EMP.  These analysts point out that EMP
technology has been explored by several other nations, and as circuitry becomes more
miniaturized, modern electronics become increasingly vulnerable to disruption.  They
argue that it could possibly take years for the United States to recover fully from
widespread damage to electronics resulting from a large-scale EMP attack.8  
Electromagnetic Pulse Weapons  
An electromagnetic pulse (EMP), characterized as an energy weapon potentially
threatening to national security, usually is created by two methods.  High-Altitude
Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) is an instantaneous electromagnetic energy field
produced in the atmosphere by the power and radiation of a nuclear explosion, and
that is damaging to electronic equipment over a very wide area, depending on the
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atmosphere, generating a powerful electrical field.  This EMP effect is strongest at altitudes
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design of the nuclear device and altitude of the burst.  High-Power Microwaves
(HPM) can also produce intense energy effects, including instantaneous
electromagnetic pulses, and are created through special equipment that transforms
battery power, or powerful chemicals (either by reaction or explosion), into intense
microwaves that are very damaging to electronics within a much smaller area.  
In addition, while HEMP weapons are large in scale and require a nuclear
capability along with technology to launch high altitude missiles, HPM weapons are
smaller in scale, and can sometimes involve a much lower level of technology, which
may be within the capability of several non-state organizations.  HPM can cause
damage to computers similar to HEMP, although the effects are limited to a much
smaller area.  The technical accessibility, lower cost, and the apparent vulnerability
of U.S. civilian electronic equipment could make small-scale HPM weapons
attractive for terrorist groups in the future.  
Description of High-Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse 
HEMP is produced when a nuclear weapon is detonated high above the Earth’s
surface, creating gamma-radiation that interacts with the atmosphere to create an
instantaneous intense electromagnetic energy field that is harmless to people as it
radiates outward, but which can overload computer circuitry with effects similar to,
but causing damage much more swiftly than a lightning strike.9  The effects of HEMP
became fully known to the United States in 1962 during a high-altitude nuclear test
(code named “Starfish Prime”) over the Pacific Ocean, when radio stations and
electronic equipment were disrupted 800 miles away through parts of Hawaii.  The
HEMP effect can span thousands of miles, depending on the altitude and the design
and power of the nuclear burst (a single device detonated at an appropriate altitude
over Kansas reportedly could affect all of the continental United States)10, and can
be picked up by metallic conductors such as wires or power cables, acting as
antennas to conduct the energy shockwave into the electronic systems of cars,
airplanes, and communications equipment.
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(L-band), or 3 cm long (X-band) are often used for radar or communications.  
12 A Flux Compression Generator consists of explosives packed inside a cylinder, all of
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Source: Heritage Foundation, Jack Spencer, America’s Vulnerability to a Different Nuclear Threat:
An Electromagnetic Pulse, Backgrounder #1372, May 26, 2000, [http://www.heritage.org/Research/
MissileDefense/bg1372.cfm].
Description of High-Power Microwave
Microwaves are characterized by electromagnetic energy with wavelengths as
small as centimeters or millimeters, and can be used at moderate power levels for
communications or for radar.11  High Power Microwaves can be produced as a
weapon when a powerful chemical detonation is transformed through a special coil
device, called a flux compression generator, into a much stronger electromagnetic
field.12  Other methods, such as combining reactive chemicals or using powerful
batteries and capacitors, can also be used to create a reusable HPM weapon.  HPM
energy can be focused using a specially-shaped antenna, or emitter, to produce effects
similar to HEMP within a confined area, or over a limited distance.  Unlike HEMP,
however, HPM radiation uses shorter wave forms at higher-frequencies which make
it highly effective against electronic equipment and more difficult to harden against.
Figure 1.  Estimated Area Affected by High-Altitude EMP
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14 Victorino Matus, “Dropping the E-bomb,” The Weekly Standard, Feb. 2, 2003,
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15 William Graham, Electromagnetic Pulse Threats to U.S. Military and Civilian
Infrastructure, hearing before the Military Research and Development Subcommittee,
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17 Experts may disagree on whether the damaging effects of HPM actually diminish
following the familiar inverse-square-of-the-distance rule.  Michael Abrams, “The Dawn of
the E-Bomb,” IEEE Spectrum, Nov. 2003, [http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/WEBONLY/
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A mechanically simple, suitcase-sized device, using a chemical explosive and special
focusing antenna, might theoretically produce a one-time, instantaneous HPM
shockwave that could disrupt many computers within a 1-mile range.13  Also, HPM
energy at higher power levels (megawatts), and powered for a longer time interval,
reportedly could cause physical harm to persons near the source emitter, or possibly
in the path of a narrowly focused energy beam.14
Disruptive Capabilities of HEMP and HPM Weapons
Studies related to the effects of electromagnetic weapons have been published
infrequently, or remain classified.15  Nevertheless, it is known that a powerful HEMP
field as it radiates outward can interfere with radio frequency links and instantly
produce damaging voltage and currents in electronic devices thousands of miles from
the nuclear explosion.  Effectiveness is increased if the electronic devices are
connected to any metal that could also act as an antenna.  Because infrastructure
computer systems are interconnected, a widespread HEMP effect could lead to
possible long-term disruption of power, fuel distribution, transportation systems, food
and water supplies, hospitals, and law enforcement communications, as well as
military communications systems which utilize the civilian infrastructure. 
A HEMP attack directed against the Unites States continent might involve a
one-megaton nuclear warhead,  or a smaller one that is specially-designed, using a
burst several hundred miles above the mid-western states to affect computers on both
coasts.16  However, creating a HEMP effect over an area 250 miles in diameter, an
example size for a battlefield, might only require a rocket with a modest altitude and
payload capability that could loft a relatively small nuclear device.  If a medium or
higher range missile with a nuclear payload were launched from the deck of a
freighter at sea, the resulting HEMP could reportedly disable computers over a wide
area of the coastal United States.  
The disruptive effects of both HEMP and HPM reportedly diminish with
distance, and electronic equipment that is turned off is less likely to be damaged.17
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18 Victorino Matus, “Dropping the E-bomb,” The Weekly Standard, Feb. 2, 2003,
[http://theweeklystandard.com/Utilities/printer_preview.asp?idArticle=2209&R=9F0C22
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19 The Federation of American Scientists, “Nuclear Weapons EMP Effects,”
[http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/emp.htm], and Report of the Commission to Assess the
Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack, Vol.1: Executive
Report 2004, p.5.
To produce maximum coverage for the HEMP effect, a nuclear device must explode
very high in the atmosphere, too far away from the earth’s surface to cause injury or
damage directly from heat or blast.  Also, HEMP produced by the nuclear explosion
is instantaneous — too brief to start current flowing within a human body — so there
is no effect on people.  However, microwave energy weapons (HPM) are smaller-
scale, are delivered at a closer range to the intended target, and can sometimes be
emitted for a longer duration.  These capabilities can cause a painful burning
sensation or other injury to a person directly in the path of the focused power beam,
or can be fatal if a person is too close to the microwave emitter.18  Both HEMP and
HPM can permanently immobilize vehicles with electronic ignition and control
systems. 
A high altitude nuclear explosion (that creates HEMP) produces three major
energy  components that arrive in sequence, and which have measurably different
effects that can be cumulatively damaging to electronic equipment.  The first energy
component is the initial energy shockwave which lasts about one microsecond, and
is similar to extremely intense static electricity that can overload circuitry for every
electronic device that is within line of sight of the burst.  A secondary energy
component then arrives, which has characteristics that are similar to a lightning
strike.  By itself, this second energy component might not be an issue for some
critical infrastructure equipment, if anti-lightning protective measures are already in
place.  However, the rise time of the first component is so rapid and intense that it
can destroy many protective measures, allowing the second component to further
disrupt the electronic equipment.  The third energy component is a longer-lasting
magnetic signal, from about one microsecond to one full second in duration.  This
geomagnetic signal causes an effect that is damaging primarily to long-lines
electronic equipment.  A localized magnetic effect builds up throughout the length
of the transmission lines and then quickly collapses, producing a
magnetohydrodynamic (MHD) “heave,” or “late-time,” power surge that overloads
equipment connected to the power and telecommunications infrastructure.  This late-
time effect adds to the initial HEMP effect, and systems connected to long-lines
power and communications systems may be further disrupted by the combined
effects.  Smaller isolated systems do not collect so much of this third energy
component, and are usually disrupted only by the first energy component of HEMP.19
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21 Lowell Wood, statement before the House Research and Development Subcommittee,
hearing on.EMP Threats to the U.S. Military and Civilian Infrastructure, Oct. 7, 1999.
22 Electrical systems connected to any wire or line that can act as an antenna may be
disrupted.  [http://www.physics.northwestern.edu/classes/2001Fall/Phyx135-2/19/emp.htm].
Army Training Manual 5-692-2, April 15, 2001, “Maintenance of Mechanical and Electrical
Equipment at Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Facilities, HEMP Protection Systems, Chapter 27,
[http://www.usace.army.mil/publications/armytm/tm5-692-2/chap27VOL-2.pdf].
An HPM weapon has a shorter possible range than HEMP, but it can induce
currents large enough to melt circuitry, or it can cause equipment to fail minutes,
days, or even weeks later.  Recently, a U.S. Comanche helicopter, flying in New
York while performing a radar test involving HPM weapons, generated a low-level
energy pulse that reportedly disrupted for two weeks the global positioning systems
(GPS) being used to land commercial aircraft at an airport in Albany, New York.20
Older electrical components, such as vacuum tubes, are generally built more
massively, and are more tolerant of electromagnetic pulse.  However, as modern
electronics shrink in size, circuitry is becoming increasingly vulnerable to
electromagnetic interference.  Therefore, countries with infrastructure that relies on
older technology may be less vulnerable to the disabling effects of HEMP or HPM
than countries that rely on a higher level of technology.21
Hardening Against HEMP and HPM Weapons
Electronic equipment may be hardened by surrounding it with protective
metallic shielding which routes damaging electromagnetic fields away from highly
sensitive electrical components.  This method, known as Faraday cage protection, is
traditionally used to protect electronic equipment from a lightning strike.  However,
power surges HEMP or HPM weapons could possibly involve peak currents of tens
of millions of amps which can pass through a protective Faraday cage.  Additionally,
equipment placed within a Faraday cage may also be made vulnerable by any wires
running into to the cage which can conduct the electromagnetic shockwave into the
equipment.  Depending on the power level involved, points of entry into the shielded
cages can sometimes be protected from electromagnetic pulse by using specially-
designed surge protectors, special wire termination procedures, screened isolated
transformers, spark gaps, or other types of specially-designed electrical filters.
Critical systems may also be protected by increasing the number of backup units, and
by keeping these units dispersed and out of range of the electromagnetic pulse source
emitter.22
 Hardening most military systems, and mass-produced commercial equipment
including PCs and communications equipment, against HEMP or HPM reportedly
would add from 3% to 10% to the total cost, if the hardening is engineered into the
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original design.  To retro-fit existing military electrical equipment with hardening
would add about 10% to the total cost.23
DOD Applications of HEMP and HPM
Underground testing of nuclear devices done in 1992 at the Nevada Test Site
were designed to research protection techniques to harden military systems against
HEMP effects resulting from a nuclear exchange.24  The Limited Test Ban Treaty of
1963 prohibits nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in space, and under water.
Since then, testing to calibrate the effects of large-scale HEMP on the critical
infrastructure has been restricted.  The design of new simulators to help measure
these effects would call for complex computations to represent the large number of
possible interactions between components found in the circuit boards, network
connections, wireless systems, hardware modules, and operating environments of
modern electronic systems that support the critical infrastructure.  
 DOD research on pulsed-power HPM electromagnetic weapons is currently
being done at Kirtland Air Force Base, in Albuquerque, New Mexico.  Weapons now
being developed by the U.S. military for electronic warfare can disrupt the trajectory
of missiles while in flight, and can overpower or degrade enemy communications,
telemetry, and circuitry.  Other HPM weapons being tested by the military are
portable and re-usable through battery-power, and are effective when fired miles
away from a target.  These weapons can also be focused like a laser beam and tuned
to an appropriate frequency in order to penetrate electronics that are heavily shielded
against a nuclear attack.  The deepest bunkers with the thickest concrete walls
reportedly are not safe from such a beam if they have even a single unprotected wire
reaching the surface.25 
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, many Iraqi command bunkers and suspected
chemical-biological weapons bunkers were deeply buried underground and thought
to be difficult to disable using conventional explosives.  New HPM weapons were
reportedly considered for possible use in attacks against these targets because the
numerous communications and power lines leading into the underground bunkers
offered pathways for conducting powerful surges of electromagnetic energy that
could destroy the computer equipment inside.26  The term “non-kinetic” is sometimes
used to describe the group of weapons with the above capabilities.  This term
includes weapons designed to emit directed energy that, in short pulses, may disable
computer circuitry, or in other applications, may cause temporary physical
discomfort.  
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DOD has developed the “Active Denial System,” which is a non-lethal weapon
system designed to emit millimeter-wavelength energy that can be directed to
penetrate 1/64 of an inch below the surface of a person’s skin.  This agitates water
molecules and produces the sensation of heat, causing the targeted person to stop
whatever they are doing and flee the area of the beam.  The effect reportedly ends the
moment the person is out of the microwave beam.27   
Because instantaneous HPM energy can reflect off the ground and possibly
affect piloted aircraft above, much testing currently involves HPM devices on
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and the Air Force Conventional Air-Launched
Cruise Missile system.  By 2010, DOD reportedly plans to field several air-launched
UAVs using disposable and reusable HPM weapons to disrupt enemy computers.28
Capabilities of Other Nations
Reportedly, several potential U.S. adversaries, such as Russia or China, are now
capable of launching a crippling HEMP strike against the United States with a
nuclear-tipped ballistic missile, and other nations, such as North Korea, could
possibly have the capability by 2015.29  Other nations that could possibly develop a
capability for HEMP operations over the next few years include United Kingdom,
France, India, Israel, and Pakistan.  
In 2005, Iran reportedly acquired several medium and intermediate-range
ballistic missiles from North Korea, with a range of 2,500 miles.30  Also, reportedly,
Iran has tested several of their Shahab-3 ballistic missiles, which exploded in mid-
flight.  While these explosions appear to be the result of a missile self-destruct
mechanism, Iran has officially described the tests as fully successful.  It was noted
by witnesses at a recent hearing of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, that this
contradiction could indicate practice by Iran for the execution of an HEMP attack.31
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However, other observers caution that these and similar actions might simply be a
scare tactic used by Iran, but without much substance.32
According to a recent DOD report, China is actively pursuing the development
of electromagnetic pulse weapons, and is devoting significant resources to
development of other electronic warfare systems and laser weapons.  The report also
notes that China’s leaders view offensive counter space weapons and other
space-based defense systems as part of inevitable scenarios for future warfare.  The
report notes that China could have 30 ICBMs capable of striking the United States
by 2005, and as many as 60 by the end of the decade.  Also, China may reportedly
replace 20 of its current ICBMs with a longer-range version by the end of this
decade, or sooner.33 
Vladimir Lukin, the former Soviet Ambassador to the United States, and former
Chairman of the International Affairs Committee for the Russian Parliament,
reportedly has stated that Russia currently has a capability to create a HEMP effect
over the United States.34  During 1962, the then Soviet Union conducted a series of
atmospheric nuclear tests and observed HEMP effects that included surge protector
burnouts, power supply breakdowns, and damage to overhead and underground
buried cables at distances of 600 kilometers.  Since then, Russia has reportedly made
extensive preparations to protect their infrastructure against HEMP by hardening
both civilian and military electronic equipment, and by providing continuous training
for personnel operating these protected systems.35  Other sources have reportedly
stated that Russia may also have some of the leading physicists in the world currently
doing research on electronic warfare weapons and electromagnetic pulse effects.36
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statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee Strategic Subcommittee on
Command Posture, July 11, 2001, p.11, [http://www.defenselink.mil/dodgc/lrs/-
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Ground Wave Emergency Network  
During the Cold War, the US Military designed an innovative communications
system to relay emergency messages between strategic military areas in the
continental United States, using signals that travel by means of low frequency ground
waves — electromagnetic fields that hug the ground — rather than by radiating into
the atmosphere.  The Ground Wave Emergency Network, or GWEN system, was
intended to allow continuous communications despite EMP disruptions.  However,
the hardware was reportedly transistor based, leaving the system with some level of
vulnerability to EMP.  In addition, the fixed locations of GWEN sites were known
to adversaries, and thus vulnerable to direct attack.37  
As the Cold War ended, the U.S. military took steps to reduce its nuclear arsenal
and associated infrastructure.38  After 1998, the USAF decommissioned GWEN
assets and replaced the entire system with the Single Channel Anti-Jam Man-Portable
(SCAMP) Terminal.  SCAMP uses extremely high frequency (EHF) technology, is
resistant to EMP, and offers more flexibility than GWEN because the equipment is
lightweight,  transportable, and interoperable with DOD satellite networks.39
Policy Analysis
Private Sector Vulnerability  
What is the United States doing to protect critical infrastructure systems against
the threat of electromagnetic pulse?  What is the appropriate response from the
United States to a nuclear HEMP attack, where there may be widespread damage to
electronics, but relatively little, or possibly no loss of life as a direct result?  How
could the United States determine which nation launched a HEMP attack?  After
experiencing a HEMP effect, the United States may retain its capability to use
strategic weapons for nuclear retaliation, but will the U.S. industrial base and critical
infrastructure be crippled and incapable of supporting a sustained military campaign?
During such time, would the United States be capable of a making an effective
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response should other nations chose to make military advances in other parts of the
world?
Some assert that little has been done by the private sector to protect against the
threat from electromagnetic pulse, and that commercial electronic systems in the
United States could be severely damaged by either HEMP or smaller-scale HPM.40
Officials of several U.S. power stations and public utilities have stated that their
electrical systems currently have no protection against electromagnetic pulse.41
However, electric power and telephone utilities have been known to fail as a result
of solar storms which cause effects similar to, but less severe than HEMP from a
nuclear blast.  Commercial electronic surge arresters used for lightning strikes
reportedly do not clamp fast enough to protect against the instantaneous effects of
electromagnetic pulse, and some may also not have great enough current carrying
capacity.42  
Military Vulnerability  
In 2005, DOD reportedly completed its response to the 2004 commission report,
but it has not yet implemented a proposed EMP Action Plan (classified), which was
recently submitted to the Secretary of Defense.43  
The effects of large-scale HEMP have been studied over several years by the
Defense Atomic Support Agency, the Defense Nuclear Agency, and the Defense
Special Weapons Agency, and is currently being studied by the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DTRA).   However, the application of the results of these studies
has been uneven across military weapons and communications systems.  Some
analysts state that U.S. strategic military systems (intercontinental ballistic missiles
and long-range bombers) may have strong protection against HEMP, while most U.S.
weapons systems used for the battlefield do not, and that this uneven protection is
undoubtedly known to our potential adversaries.44   Some analysts reportedly state
that limited testing has shown that modern commercial equipment may be
surprisingly resistant to the effects of electromagnetic pulse, and in addition to the
SCAMP system, some military systems using commercial equipment are retrofitted
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to increase resistance to EMP.45  However, there is disagreement among observers
about whether test procedures used by the U.S. military may have been flawed,
leading to erroneous conclusions about the effects of electromagnetic pulse on
commercial electronics.46
The U.S. military has adopted a policy where possibly vulnerable commercial
electronic equipment is now used extensively in support of complex U.S. weapons
systems.  For example, a large percentage of U.S. military communications during
Operation Iraqi Freedom was reportedly carried by commercial satellites, and much
military administrative information is currently routed through the civilian Internet.47
Many commercial communications satellites, particularly those in low earth orbit,
reportedly may degrade or cease to function shortly after a high altitude nuclear
explosion.48  However, some observers believe that possible HEMP and HPM
vulnerabilities of military information systems are outweighed by the benefits gained
through access to innovative technology and increased communications flexibility
that come from using state-of-the-art electronics and from maintaining connections
to the civilian Internet and satellite systems. 
New Incentive to Develop a Nuclear Capability
A single nuclear device exploded at an appropriate altitude above the
continental United States could possibly affect our industrial capacity, economic
stability, and military effectiveness.  Does knowledge of this vulnerability, combined
with the proliferation of nuclear technology, provide a newer incentive for potential
adversaries to develop or acquire a nuclear weapons capability?  Will countries now
view the development and acquisition of nuclear weapons, even a small arsenal, as
a strategy for cyber warfare?  
During the Cold War, a HEMP attack was viewed as the first step of a nuclear
exchange involving many warheads, but the threat of mutually assured destruction
provided a lasting deterrent.  Today, the proliferation of nuclear technology makes
the threat of HEMP more difficult to assess.  Would the leader of a rogue state be
motivated to use a small nuclear arsenal to launch a crippling HEMP strike against
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the United States, with no resulting fatalities, if it believed the U.S. would likely not
retaliate with a nuclear salvo that would destroy thousands, or millions of innocent
people?  Would a HEMP strike over a disputed area during a regional conflict be
seen as a way to defeat the communications links and network centric warfare
capability of the U.S. military, and gain maximum battlefield advantage from an
existing supply of smaller nuclear warheads?49 
Terrorist Use of HPM
A smaller-scale HPM weapon requires a relatively simple design, and can be
built using electrical materials and chemical explosives that are easy to obtain.  It is
estimated that a limited-range suitcase-sized HPM weapon could be constructed for
much less than $2,000, and is within the capability of almost any nation, and perhaps
many terrorist organizations.50  Recently, DOD recruited a scientist to create two
small HPM weapons for testing using only commercially available electrical
components, such as ordinary spark plugs and coils.  One device was developed that
could be broken down into two parcels so it could be shipped by regular mail, for
example, from one terrorist to another.  The second HPM device was constructed to
fit inside a small vehicle.51  Aside from specially-trained dogs, experts reportedly say
there are no scientific methods that currently allow easy detection of an explosive
device hidden in a vehicle or inside a suitcase before it can explode.52  
It is difficult to assess the threat of a terrorist organization possibly using a
smaller-scale HPM weapon against the United States critical infrastructure.  It could
be argued that an HPM bomb by itself, may not be attractive to terrorists, because its
smaller explosion would not be violent enough, and the visible effect would not be
as dramatic as a larger, conventional bomb.  Also, constructing an HPM device is
still somewhat more technically complex than constructing a conventional bomb.
However, observers have reported that the leadership of terrorist organization may
increasingly become aware of the growing advantages from an attack launched
against U.S. critical information systems.  In addition, the use by a terrorist group of
CRS-16
53 Jerrold M. Post, Kevin G. Ruby, and Eric D. Shaw, “From Car Bombs to Logic Bombs:
The Growing Threat from Information Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence, vol.
12, no. 2  (summer 2000), pp.97-122.
54 United States Air Force Fact Sheet, Active Denial System, September, 2005,
[http://www.de.afrl.af.mil/Factsheets/ActiveDenial.pdf].  David Ruppe, “Directed-Energy
Weapons: Possible U.S. Use Against Iraq Could Threaten International Regimes,” Global
Secur i ty  Newswire,  Aug.  16 ,  2002,  [h t tp : / /www.globalsecur i ty. -
org/org/news/2002/020816-dew.htm ]. 
55 Victorino Matus, “Dropping the E-bomb,” The Weekly Standard, Feb. 2, 2003,
[http://theweeklystandard.com/Utilities/printer_preview.asp?idArticle=2209&R=9F0C22
5C3].
a new weapon directed at U.S. information systems would attract widespread media
attention, and may motivate other rival groups to follow along a new pathway.53  
Additionally, the explosives used in a smaller, or suitcase-sized HPM device
could simultaneously be used to disperse radioactive materials, making it a so-called
“dirty bomb”.  This combination would offer a possible two-for-one effect, where the
dispersed radioactive materials could generate immediate near-panic, while the
HPM-damaged computers might not be noticed until days later.  This potential
double effect could improve the attractiveness of using an HPM device as a terrorist
weapon.   
Human Rights Objections
 HEMP and HPM energy weapons primarily damage electronic systems, with
little or no direct effect on humans, however, these effects may also be difficult to
limit or control.  HEMP or HPM energy fields, as they instantly spread outward, may
also affect nearby hospital equipment or personal medical devices, such as pace-
makers, and may damage critical electronic systems throughout other parts of the
surrounding civilian infrastructure.  For this reason, some international human rights
organizations may object to the development and use of HEMP or HPM as weapons.
Testing for directed microwave energy weapons used for controlling or
dispersing crowds reportedly shows that these types of weapons cause a painful
burning sensation on the skin, but the effects are temporary, and cause no long-term
physical damage.54  However, some observers report that a very powerful,
instantaneous HPM beam could possibly injure persons in the beam path, or could
be fatal if persons are too close to the energy-focusing antenna.55  Others may
question what might happen if some persons were caught in the crush of the crowd
and were unable to flee the microwave energy beam quickly.
Legislative Activity
In 1997, the House National Security Committee held a hearing on the Threat
Posed by Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) to U.S. Military Systems and Civil
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Infrastructure,56 and in 1999, the House Military Research and Development
Subcommittee held a hearing on the potential threats to United States civilian and
military systems from and electromagnetic pulse attack.57  
In March 2005, Senator Jon Kyl chaired a hearing of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security, to
review the findings of the 2004 EMP commission, discuss jurisdiction for
implementing EMP recommendations, and also discuss possible new EMP threats.
The EMP commission, which was created under the 2001 Defense Authorization
Act, came into existence before the Department of Homeland Security was created.
During the March 2005 hearing, it was emphasized that Homeland Security
Presidential Directives 7 and 8 both provide the authority for the federal government,
through DHS, to protect against terrorist attack, which may include EMP attack.
Therefore, it was suggested that DHS could possibly take over jurisdiction for
implementing the commission’s five-year plan.58  Also, the new and growing nuclear
and missile capabilities of Iran were discussed. 
The EMP commission’s 2004 report focuses mainly on the effects of HEMP and
not necessarily on HPM.  Testimony during the 2004 presentation raised questions,
such as: (1) how would the United States respond to a limited HEMP attack against
the U.S. homeland or against U.S. forces, where there is loss of technology, but no
loss of life; (2) does the current lack of U.S. preparedness invite adversaries to plan
and attempt a HEMP attack; and (3) are the long-term effects of a successful HEMP
attack, leading to possible widespread starvation and population reduction,
potentially more devastating to the U.S. homeland than an attack by surface nuclear
weapons? 
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